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Abstract:  Using content analyses, this study examines whether board structure of 
small listed companies influence their shareholders’ wealth. This study focuses on 
three elements of board structure, namely, board size, board composition and 
directors’ remuneration to examine the relationship between board structure and 
shareholders’ wealth. Shareholders’ wealth is measured by the return on investment 
and earnings per share. The results show that out of the three elements of board 
structure, board size and board composition play an important role in influencing 
shareholders’ wealth in small listed companies. The results support the findings in 
earlier studies that large number of directors and the proportion of executive directors 
in a board would instil better decision-making policy. The results in this study, 
however, did not support the contention that there is a significant relationship 
between the directors’ remuneration and financial performance. The results in this 
study complement previous studies and provide some understanding on the 
importance of practicing good corporate governance. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
Financial performance serves as a general measure of a company’s overall financial health over a given 
period of time. It can be used to compare with other similar companies across the same industry or to 
compare industries or sectors in aggregation. Financial performance acts as an indicator to provide 
warning signs or corrective actions needed to improve the company’s financial performance (Barry et al. 
2000; Boehlje 1993). Data relating to performance measure generally could be obtained from the 
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statement of financial position, statement of financial performance and the statement of cash flow (Kay 
and Edwards 1994; Purdy and Langemeier 1995). One useful tool that is often being used to analyse the 
success, failure and progress of a company is the financial ratio measures (Barry et al. 2000; Ferguson 
1990; Hasseldine et al. 2005).  
With specific attention to shareholders, two common financial measures used to determine whether 
the amount of investment invested into a company is worthwhile are the return on investment (ROI) and 
earnings per share (EPS) (Barry et al., 2000). ROI is considered an important measure as it provides 
indication on the success of the company to provide returns to its shareholders. EPS is also an important 
measure to shareholders since it serves as an indicator on the amount of income generated by the 
company. Of consequence, the amount of income generated would determine the viability of the 
company. Shareholders often used these two measures in assessing their managers’ ability in managing 
the company that they invested in and consequently, determining the quality of corporate governance 
practice in the company.   
Mathiesen (2002) defined corporate governance as “the field in economics that investigates how to 
secure and motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of incentive mechanisms, such as 
contracts, organisational design and legislation”. In layman’s word, corporate governance describes the 
way a company is being directed and managed (Mohd Sulaiman and Bidin 2002). One crucial area of 
corporate governance that has received wide attention in the accounting literature is the board of 
directors. Board of directors is a group of people appointed by the management of a company carrying 
equal responsibilities of leading and directing the company with the primary objective to protect the 
company’s shareholders’ interests (Abdullah, 2004). The board of directors is responsible to assess and 
evaluate the appropriateness of management’s strategies and approaches in transacting corporate goals 
(Chaganti et al. 1985; Fosberg 1989; Schellenger et al. 1989). Studies have suggested that one important 
criterion to ensure the success of the board of directors as managers is the board structure (Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991; 2003).  
Board structure distinguishes directors that hold management role in a company (executive) and 
directors who are not (non-executive) (Tricker, 1994). The chairman would be the top person in the 
board (Chin and Tai, 2001).  Elements of board structure include the number and types of board 
committees, flow of information among these committees, committee membership and patterns of 
committee membership (Zahra and Pearce, 1989). Examining board structure is important since 
differences in board structure could affect a company’s performance and of consequence, affect the 
viability of a company (Daily and Dalton, 1994).  
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The next section provides a review of relevant 
literature. Section 3 provides the framework and hypotheses underpinning this study. Section 4 outlines 
the research design. The results are presented in section 5. The summary and conclusion are provided in 
the last section. 
 
2.  LITERATURE REVIEW 
  
Studies have shown that there are many factors that could influence company’s performance. Within the 
corporate governance literature, the board structure appears to be the most favoured issue examined. 
Most studies focused on the link between board structure and company’s performance due to the 
growing realisation among managers and companies for the need to become internationally competitive 
(Andrew 1980; Harris and Raviv 2004). Another possible attribute could be due to the 1997/1998 Asia 
financial crisis as well as the Enron, Tyco and Adelphi scandals in 2000/2001 which has badly affected 
most countries. Of consequence, such financial crisis has awake the need for corporate governance 
restructuring among companies.  This is consistent to the Malaysian Corporate Governance Code stated 
that the best practice in corporate governance is when the board of directors fulfil their responsibility as 
managers of the company (MCCG 2000). However, the effectiveness of a board of directors in fulfilling 
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their responsibility could be affected by the way the board is structured.  
Board structure primarily consists of board size, board composition, directors’ remuneration, 
directors’ tenure, CEO duality and directors’ ownership (MCCG 2000). The existence of the elements of 
board structure has led to the emergence of corporate governance literature. Most of the studies focused 
on CEO duality (such as Abdullah 2004; Dalton and Kesner 1987) and board composition (such as Chin 
and Tai 2001; Dalton and Daily 1999; Davis et al, 1997; Johnson et al. 1996; Zahra and Pearce 1989). 
However, it has been noted that three main important elements of board structure are the board size, 
board composition and directors’ remuneration (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Hermalin and Weisbach 
1991; Pfeffer 1972).  
Board size refers to the total number directors in a company (Abdullah 2004; Hermalin and Weusbach 
1991). The number of directors in a board of directors of a company ranges from small to large number, 
with recent years, on average, the number of directors is about 20 (Morgan 2006). Within the corporate 
governance literature, studies have examined the effect of board size on company’s performance (Bhagat 
and Black 1996; Chaganti et al. 1985; Yermack 1996; Zahra and Pearc, 1989). There are studies that 
have shown increases in board size would negatively affect company’s performance (Bhagat and Black 
1996; Yermack 1996; Zahra and Pearce 1989). These studies’ findings are consistent to the argument of 
Jensen (1993) that states the increase in group size would result to a less effective performance due to the 
overwhelming problems in coordination and process. However, there are studies that conclude increases 
in board size improve company’s performance (Eisenberg et al. 1998; Lanser 1969). Other studies have 
found no relationship between board size and performance (Van Ees et al. 2003).  
A body of the literature has also examined the effect of board composition on company’s performance 
(Baysinger and Butler 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998). Board composition refers to the proportion 
of executive and non-executive directors in a company (Dalton and Kesner 1987; Fosberg 1989; Preffer 
1972). The results, however, are mixed. There are studies that found positive relationship between board 
composition and company’s performance in which larger proportion of non-executive directors lead to 
better performance (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Hermalin and Weisbach 1998; Preffer 1972). On the 
contrary, other studies found that more executive directors would improve performance (Kesner 1987; 
Vancil 1987). They found more executive directors would assist the CEO to maximise the company’s 
value by providing advice and knowledge about the day-to-day operation. However, there are also 
studies that found no linkage between board composition and performance (Hermalin and Weisbach 
1991). 
Another body of the literature has examined directors’ remuneration and its impact on company’s 
performance. Directors’ remuneration refers to the total remuneration received by the directors of a 
company (Firth et al. 1999; Mehran 1995) 4 . Studies that examined the link between directors’ 
remuneration and company’s performance (such as Firth et al. 1999; Mehran 1995) found that there is a 
positive relationship between directors’ remuneration. However, in Li et al. (2005), they found excessive 
directors’ remuneration would lead to poor performance. Of consequence, poor performance would lead 
to poor corporate governance practice. Other studies found no conclusive evidence (Van Ees et al. 2003).  
One possible reason to the mixed findings in the corporate governance literature on board size, board 
composition and directors’ remuneration could be attributed by the sample used. There are studies that 
have focused on examining large listed companies (such as Dalton and Kesner 1987; Preffer 1972) such 
as a company listed on the main board of the stock exchange. There are also studies that examined listed 
companies without segregating main board or second board of the stock exchange (such as Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991). Other studies have focused on a particular industry such as Van Ees et al. (2003). 
However, the results in these studies may not represent other groups such as small listed companies. 
Re-examining this issue using an average or small listed companies (such as companies listed on the 
second board of stock exchange) could determine whether similar results shown using large listed 
companies would appear.   
Further, most studies linking board structure and financial performance were conducted in different 
                                                        
4 This includes the salaries, fees, allowances and bonuses 
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setting. For example; There are studies that have used comparative setting between countries (such as 
Daily and Dalton 1994; Dalton and Kesner 1987; Dalton et al., 1988). Other studies have used setting in 
developed countries such as in USA (Kesner and Dalton 1986; Yermack 1996; Hermalin and Weisbach 
1998), Russia (Peng et al. 2003), Netherlands (Van Ees et al. 2003), China (Li et al. 2007) and New 
Zealand (Chandler and Hernshall 1982; Turner 1985). Study on examining the link between board 
structure and company’s performance however, is under-researched in the context of developing 
countries, such as in Malaysia.  
In a Malaysian setting, limited studies have examined whether board structure influences company’s 
performance (Abdullah 2004; Chang 2004; Doraisami 2003). Abdullah (2004) and Chang (2004) 
examined the link between board structure (CEO duality) and companies’ performance. They found that 
there is a significant relationship between CEO duality and companies’ performance. However, 
Abdullah’s and Chang’s study is limited to examination of only one element of board structure, namely, 
CEO duality. As noted earlier, there are other elements of board structure that could affect companies’ 
performance and therefore, need attention. Three important elements in a board structure are the board 
size, board composition and directors’ remuneration (Grinstein and Hribar 2004; Hermalin and 
Weisbach 1991; Pfeffer 1972).  This study aims to examine this issue using the three elements: board size, 
board composition and directors’ remuneration on shareholders’ wealth as measured by ROI and EPS in 
small listed companies in Malaysia5. The results would provide new contribution to the corporate 
governance literature and shed some lights and knowledge to the management and corporate governance 
board on the effect of board structure on financial performance.   
 
3.  FRAMEWORK  
  
3.1  Framework 
Figure 1 illustrates the framework that underpins this study. The framework shows that board structure 
of a company may influence shareholder’ wealth as measured by ROI and EPS. Three elements of board 
structure are examined in this study. The three elements of board structure are board size, board 
composition and directors’ remuneration.  
Studies have shown that shareholders often rely on financial performance measures such as ratio to 
determine their return on investment (Hassaldine et al. 2005). Through ratio, shareholders could 
determine whether the company that they have invested in practice good corporate governance. 
Although a large number of studies have examined the factors that influence a company’s performance, 
the results from the studies are inconclusive. Further, most studies focused on financial performance in 
general, downplaying the importance of examining shareholders’ wealth. In the context of this study, two 
performance measures that relates to shareholders’ wealth are the ROI and EPS. It would be interesting 
to know whether the results shown in previous studies would also appear in this study. Therefore, 
shareholders’ wealth becomes the independent variable.  
Many studies have examined board size and its linkages to a company’s performance (such as 
Abdullah 2004; Ahmed et al. 2005; Chaganti et al. 1985; Yermarck 1996). These studies have shown that 
board size could affect company’s performance. Furthermore, larger number of executive directors in the 
board of directors would allow the directors to adopt higher integrity and credibility to achieve better 
performance. They could also share ideas and knowledge to provide effective decision-making 
(Eisenberg et al., 1998). However, there are studies that conclude no significant relationship between 
board size and company’s performance (Chaganti et al. 1985; Preffer 1972; Van Ees et al. 2003). The 
                                                        
5 In the context of this study, small listed companies are companies that are registered in the second main of Bursa 
Malaysia. For a company to be listed in the second board of Bursa Malaysia, the companies must achieve the 
minimum aggregate after-tax profit over three to five financial years of RM12million, while the minimum after-tax 
profit for the most recent financial year should be RM4million. 
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mixed findings lead this study to re-examine this issue. Therefore, board size is the first independent 
variables.  
Another body of the literature has suggested that board composition plays an important role in 
influencing positive or negative influence on companies’ performance. Kesner (1987) argued that 
reducing the proportion of non-executive directors increases company’s performance. The higher the 
proportion of executive directors in a board of directors, the higher would be the value of shareholders’ 
wealth (Peng et al. 2003). This argument exists due to the fact that since executive shareholders are also 
the shareholders, they would strive to maximise their wealth. On the contrary, Mace (1971) and Vancil 
(1987) argued that more proportion of non-executive directors would be more beneficial to the 
company’s value since they brought into the company their knowledge on functional specialist and 
particular technical process. Since studies in examining board composition and company’s performance 
provide mixed findings, board composition is the second independent variable. 
The last important element examined in this study is directors’ remuneration. Studies have suggested 
that directors receiving high remuneration often performed better than directors receiving low 
remuneration (Firth et al. 1999; Mehran 1995). Such performance would lead to improving company’s 
performance and shareholders’ wealth. However, in Malaysia, there is yet a study that has examined 
whether there is relationship between directors’ remuneration and shareholders’ wealth and if yes, 
whether the relationship would appear to be positive or negative relationship. Therefore, directors’ 
remuneration becomes the third independent variable.  
 
3.2. Hypotheses  
The development of the framework in this study consequentially led to the development of three 
hypotheses. Many studies have examined board size and its linkages to a company’s performance (such 
as Abdullah 2004; Ahmed et al. 2005; Chaganti et al. 1985; Yermarck 1996). Most of these studies 
showed negative relationship between board size and company’s performance in which smaller board 
size would provide higher company’s performance compared to larger board size (Ahmed et. al. 2005; 
Yermarck 1996). There are, however, studies that found no relationship between board size and 
company’s performance (such as Chaganti et al. 1985; Van Ees et al. 2003; Preffer 1972) and studies that 
found positive link between board size and company’s performance (such as Eisenberg et al. 1998).  The 
inconsistent findings motivate this study to re-examine this issue by focusing on shareholders’ wealth. 
The following hypothesis is developed: 
H1: There is no significant relationship between board size and shareholders’ wealth 
A number of studies found that a higher proportion of non-executive directors in the board would 
result to higher performance of the company (Baysinger and Butler 1985; Preffer 1972). These studies 
argued that non-executive directors would have less biasness in their role as a monitoring officer. On the 
other hand, other studies found that a higher proportion of executive directors would results better on the 
performance as they could communicate and liaise with the management (Kesner 1987; Peng et al. 2003). 
These studies argued that executive directors would assist the management in the day-to-day operations 
which eventuate to high level of performance. Other studies found contradictory results (Mace 1971; 
Vancil 1987) or no significant influence (Hermalin and Weisbach 1991; Schellenger et al. 1989). This 
study aims to re-examine this issue to provide more conclusive evidence. The second hypothesis is 
developed. 
H2: There is no significant relationship between board composition and shareholders’ wealth 
Studies that examined directors’ remuneration and its linkages to company’s performance reported 
that there is a significant positive relationship exists between directors’ remuneration and company’s 
performance (Firth et al. 1999; Mehran, 1995). These studies showed that a company with high 
directors’ remuneration is a reflection of the company performing well. On the other hand, no significant 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and financial performance was found in Van Ees et al. 
(2003). Surprisingly, in Li et al. (2007), they found that excessive directors’ remuneration reflects poor 
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corporate governance and would eventuate to poor company’s performance. The mixed results motivate 
this study to re-examine this issue in a Malaysian setting. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
developed. 
H3: There is no significant relationship between directors’ remuneration and shareholders’ wealth 
 
4.  RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
This study focuses on whether the board structure of a company influences shareholders’ wealth in small 
listed companies. Specifically, this study aims to examine whether: 
First, board size of a company influences shareholders’ wealth as measured by ROI and EPS 
Second, board composition of a company influences shareholders’ wealth as measured by ROI and 
EPS. 
Third, directors’ remuneration influences shareholders’ wealth as measured by ROI and EPS. 
This study examines these issues by way of content analyses. 
 
4.1. Sample 
The companies that are registered on the second board of Bursa Malaysia are chosen as the sample study6. 
These companies are chosen because there is yet a study in Malaysia that has used this sample. Previous 
studies in Malaysian setting (such as Abdullah 2004; Chang 2004; Doraisami 2003) have used 
companies registered on the main board, Bursa Malaysia, leaving examination on companies registered 
on other listings largely under-researched. This study attempts to alleviate this gap by using the sample 
chosen. 
The final sample is chosen based on stratified sampling. In determining the final sample, all 
companies listed on the second board of Bursa Malaysia were identified through browsing the website or 
from the Bursa Malaysia database. There are 298 companies listed on the Second Board, Bursa Malaysia. 
Out of the 298 companies, 98 companies were selected as the final sample. This number is acceptable 
since it represents more than 30% of the population (Sekaran 2003). The 98 companies were distributed 
according to its industry. Companies that are in the finance and loan sector, however, are excluded since 
these companies are governed by the Banking and Financial Institutions Act 1989 and therefore, would 
have different way of presenting their financial information. Table 1 presents the sample distribution 
based on stratified sampling. 
 
4.2  Data Collection  
The annual reports of the companies selected for the period 2002 to 2004 are chosen for this study. The 3 
years period is considered sufficient to show the relationship between the board structure and the 
financial performance. Further, previous studies have used somewhat within the same period (such as 
Abdullah 2004; Yu et al. 2002). Data is collected primarily on the list of directors as well as the data from 
the statement of financial position and statement of financial performance. Specifically, the data 
collected relates to variables of board structure such as board size, board composition, directors’ 
remuneration and related financial ratios such as ROI and EPS. Table 2 summarises these variables.  
 
 
                                                        
6 Bursa Malaysia is the Malaysian Stock Exchange 
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5.  RESULTS 
5.1  Descriptive Statistics of Board Structure 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the companies’ board structure for the three year period 
2002 to 2004. Three variables of board structure were chosen in this study, namely, board size, board 
composition and directors’ remuneration. Their descriptive statistics for the 3 year period are shown in 
table 3. 
Panel A, Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of board size. The results show that on average, the 
number of directors in a board is 7. The results indicate that the number of directors in a board for all 
companies on the Second Board is similar, irrespective of the year (mean score: 7.15 in 2002; 7.07 in 
2003; 7.13 in 2004). In addition, on average, the proportion of non-executive directors in a board is 55%. 
Such percentage is shown somewhat similar (mean score: 54% in 2002; 55% in 2003; 55% in 2004) in 
all the 3 year period as shown in panel B, Table 3. The results indicate that the non-executive directors in 
a board are generally more than the executive directors. 
Panel C of Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of directors’ remuneration in the companies 
registered on the second board of Bursa Malaysia. The results show that the mean score of the directors’ 
remuneration in 2002 is RM1,047,096. The mean score of the directors’ remuneration has increased to 
RM1,44,344 in 2003 but decreased in 2004 (mean score: RM1,054,269). This is surprising since it is 
expected that the directors’ remuneration would increase in 2004 due to the favourable economic 
condition in Malaysia during these period.  
 
5.2.  Descriptive Statistics of Financial Performance 
This section presents the descriptive statistics of the financial performance of the companies for the three 
year period 2002 to 2004. Panel A of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the companies’ return 
on equity by year. The results show that on average, the level of return on equity for companies listed on 
the Second Board is -9.04. Specifically, the results show that the mean score of return on equity of -6.69 
for year 2002 has decreased to -9.51 in 2003 and further decreased to -10.92 in 2004. The results indicate 
that most companies in the Second Board failed to realize an adequate return on equity invested by 
shareholders. 
Finally, panel B of Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics of the companies’ earnings per share by 
year. The results show that on average, the level of earnings per share for companies listed on the Second 
Board is -0.07 sen. The results showing mean score of earnings per share of -0.11sen in year 2002 has 
reduced to -0.05 sen in 2003 and the mean score remained unchanged in 2004. The results indicate that 
most companies in the Second Board have a lower corporate value, an indication that the companies may 
not be able to sell off their shares easily (Donald and Schindler 2003). 
 
 5.3.  The Effect of Board Size and Shareholders’ Wealth 
This section presents the results of testing hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 states that there is no significant 
relationship between board size and shareholders’ wealth.  The Spearman’s Rho test was used to test 
hypothesis 17. 
Panel A, Table 5 presents the results of the relationship between board size and ROI. The results show 
that there is a significant correlation (r=0.009). The results show that board size does have positive 
significant influence on shareholders’ wealth in terms of ROI. The results implicate that more number of 
directors in a board of directors would enhance the improvement of financial performance, particularly 
                                                        
7 This analysis was used because the nature of the data is not normally distributed. 
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on ROI.  
Panel B of Table 5 presents the results showing the relationship between the board size and EPS. The 
results also show that there is a significant correlation (r=0.010). The results indicate that more number 
of directors in the board of directors would further improve the company’s EPS. Therefore, hypothesis 1 
that states no significant relationship between board size and shareholders wealth as measured by ROI 
and EPS is rejected. 
 
5.4.  The Effect of Board Composition on Shareholders’ Wealth 
This section presents the results of testing hypothesis 2. Hypothesis 2 states that there is no significant 
relationship between board composition and shareholders’ wealth.  The Spearman’s Rho test was used to 
test hypothesis 2. 
Panel A, Table 6 presents the results of the relationship between board composition and ROI. The 
results show that there is a marginally significant correlation (r=0.060). The results show that board 
composition may have significant influence on shareholders’ wealth in terms of ROI. The results 
implicate that higher proportion number of non-executive directors in a board of directors may deter the 
improvement of ROI.  
Panel B of Table 6 presents the results showing the relationship between the board size and EPS. 
The results also show that there is a marginally significant correlation (r=0.056). The results indicate that 
higher proportion of executive directors in the board of directors may not improve the company’s EPS. 
Therefore, hypothesis 2 that states no significant relationship between board composition and 
shareholders wealth as measured by ROI and EPS may be rejected. 
 
5.5.  The Effect of Directors’ Remuneration on Shareholders’ Wealth 
This section presents the results of testing hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 states that there is no significant 
relationship between directors’ remuneration and shareholders’ wealth.  The Spearman’s Rho test was 
used to test hypothesis 3. 
Panel A, Table 7 presents the results of the relationship between directors’ remuneration and ROI. The 
results show that there is no significant correlation (r=0.449). The results show that directors’ 
remuneration does not have significant influence on shareholders’ wealth in terms of ROI. The results 
implicate that directors receiving high remuneration does not guarantee high ROI.  
Panel B of Table 7 presents the results showing the relationship between directors’ remuneration and 
EPS. The results also show that there is a no significant correlation (r=0.269). The results indicate that 
directors’ receiving high remuneration does not necessarily improve EPS. Therefore, hypothesis 3 that 
states no significant relationship between directors’ remuneration and shareholders wealth as measured 
by ROI and EPS is accepted. 
 
5.6.  Multiple Regression Analysis  
To provide more rigorous results, a multiple regression analysis was performed to determine whether the 
effect of the board structure: board size, board composition and directors’ remuneration would remain 
unchanged. 
Panel A of Table 8 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis. The results show that board 
size influences ROI. This study indicates that the number of directors could influence the efficiency of 
the board in influencing the company’s ROI. The results show a positive relationship between board size 
and return on equity (r=0.016).  The relationship is accepted with a beta value of 51.224. Therefore, 
board size is an important determinant on ROI, confirming earlier results. 
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The results also show that board composition and directors’ remuneration are not important 
determinants to influencing ROI. The results show that there is no significant relationship between board 
composition (r=0.347) and directors’ remuneration on ROI (r=0.584) as shown in panel A, Table 8. The 
results that show board composition does not influence ROI in the multiple regression analysis could be 
attributed by other factors in the study. These other factors, namely the directors’ remuneration has 
diluted the significant effect of board composition on ROI. 
Panel B, Table 8 presents the results of the multiple regression analysis on the effect of board structure 
on EPS. The results show that board size significantly influence EPS (r=0.048). This study indicates that 
the number of directors could influence the efficiency of the board and consequentially, influence EPS. 
The results strengthen the significant of this factor on EPS, indicating the existent of other variables, 
namely, board composition and directors’ remuneration did not dilute the relationship between board 
size and EPS. The results are accepted with a beta value of 0.592. 
The results in panel B, Table 8 also show that board composition may play an important role in 
influencing EPS. However, the results show a negative marginally significant relationship between 
board composition and EPS (r=0.087). The results indicate that more non-executive directors in the 
board of the companies may deter the performance in terms of EPS. The relationship is accepted with a 
beta value of -0.281. The results in panel B, Table 8, however, indicate that directors’ remuneration is not 
a significant influence on EPS (r=0.917). Hence, confirming the earlier results shown in this study. 
 
6.  SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
 
This study examines the effect of board structure on shareholders’ wealth. Three elements of board 
structure: board size, board composition and directors’ remuneration were examined on ROI and EPS. 
The results show that board size influences ROI and EPS significantly. Such results indicate that more 
directors in a board would results in better financial performance in terms of ROI and EPS. The results in 
this study are consistent to previous studies that show positive relationship between board size on 
company’s performance (Chaganti et al. 1985; Eisenberg et al. 1998). The multiple regression analyses 
further support the earlier results on the importance of board size as a determinant to shareholders’ 
wealth. 
The results also show that board composition plays may an important role in influencing shareholders’ 
wealth in terms of ROI and EPS. The results showing marginally negative relationship indicate that a 
higher proportion of executive directors may be crucial in ensuring that all the assets are being utilised 
efficiently. This study supports the findings in Dalton and Kesner (1987) that found the level of return on 
assets becomes higher in companies having higher proportion of executive directors than non-executive 
directors in the board. The results implicate that executive director are important as they could convey 
important information to management by providing advices and knowledge on day-to-day operation 
(Vancil 1987).  The results showing significant relationship between board composition and ROI in the 
multiple regression analyses provide some indication that board composition is an important 
determinant in shareholders’ wealth when other variables exist. 
The results in this study, however, did not support the contention that there is a significant relationship 
between the directors’ remuneration and shareholders’ wealth. This study implicate that a company’s 
performance does not depend on how much the directors received their compensation but more on the 
number of directors in a board or the proportion of executive and non-executive directors in a board. 
Such results are consistent to previous studies that show no significant relationship exists between 
directors’ remuneration and financial performance (Van Ees et al. 2003). Such results, however, are not 
consistent to previous studies that show higher directors’ remuneration would lead to higher financial 
performance (Firth et al. 1999; Mehran 1995).  
A key finding in this study is that board structure, particularly, board size and board composition play 
an important role in influencing financial performance. The evidence in this study points to the fact there 
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is a need to monitor and effectively organise the structure of a board to ensure good corporate 
governance practices is upheld. 
This study has few limitations. First, this study only used data of a three year period. One may 
considered this as insufficient to minimize the effect of possible short-term changes in the variable 
values within each company. Second, this study is limited to examining three components of board 
structure. There are other components such as CEO duality and audit committee which are not included 
in this study. Examining these other factors may be potentially beneficial to enhance the model 
developed in this study.  
Overall, the findings of this study provide useful insights on the effect of board structure on financial 
performance. The results in this study complement previous studies and provide some understanding on 
the importance of practicing good corporate governance.  
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TABLES 
Table 1: Summary distribution of companies 
 
Sector Population 
N 
Stratified sampling Final sample 
N 
Consumer product 58 40% 23 
Industrial product 116 40% 46 
Construction 13 40% 5 
Trading/ services 53 40% 21 
Property  3 40% 1 
Plantation 3 40% 1 
Technology 3 40% 1 
TOTAL 298 40% 98 
 
Table 2: Variables constructs used in this study 
 
Variable: Definition Previous studies 
Dependent:   
Return on equity (ROE) To measure performance on invested 
capital. 
Peng et al. (2003) 
Earnings per share (EPS) To measure performance on operation and 
profitability. 
Ahmed et al. (2005) 
   
Independent:   
Board size Number of directors in a board. Yu et al. (2002) 
Board composition The proportion of non-executive directors 
to total number of directors. 
Schellenger et al., 1989; 
Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991 
Directors’ remuneration The amount of salaries, bonuses, 
allowances and fees. 
Abowd and Kaplan (1999); 
Orlikoff and Totten (2005) 
 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Board Structure 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistic of Board Size 
Variable: Board Size Mean Number of Directors Standard Deviation 
2004 7.13 1.34 
2003 7.07 1.41 
2002 7.15 1.42 
 
Panel B: Descriptive Statistic of Board Composition 
Variable: Board Composition Mean Percentage of 
Non-Executive Directors 
Standard Deviation 
2004 54.96 16.50 
2003 55.13 15.59 
2002 54.01 15.70 
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Panel C: Descriptive Statistic of Directors’ Remuneration 
Variable: Directors’ remuneration Mean Percentage of RM Standard Deviation 
2004 1,054,268.54 785,053.05 
2003 1,144,343.93 1,069,495.80 
2002 1,047,095.69 866,397.82 
 
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of Financial Performance 
Panel A: Companies’ ROE by year 
Sector N Mean Median Standard Deviation 
2004 98 -10.92 0.80 37.37 
2003 98 -9.51 0.19 28.98 
2002 98 -6.69 1.30 28.23 
 
Panel B: Companies’ EPS by year 
Sector N Mean Sen Median Standard Deviation 
2004 98 -0.05 0.01 0.20 
2003 98 -0.05 0.00 0.60 
2002 98 -0.11 0.02 0.46 
 
Table 5: Effect of board size on shareholders’ wealth  
Panel A: Board size and ROI  
    ROI 
     
Spearman’s Rho Board Size Correlation coefficient  0.261 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.009 
  N  98 
 
Panel B: Board size and EPS  
    ROI 
     
Spearman’s Rho Board Size Correlation coefficient  0.258 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.010 
  N  98 
 
Table 6:  Effect of Board Composition on shareholders’ wealth  
Panel A: Board size and ROI  
    ROI 
     
Spearman’s Rho Board 
Composition  
Correlation coefficient  -0.191 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.060 
  N  98 
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Panel B: Board size and EPS  
    ROI 
     
Spearman’s Rho Board 
Composition 
Correlation coefficient  -0.194 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.056 
  N  98 
 
 
Table 7: Effect of Directors’ Remuneration on shareholders’ wealth  
Panel A: Board size and ROI  
    ROI 
     
Spearman’s Rho Directors’ 
Remuneration  
Correlation coefficient  0.069 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.449 
  N  98 
 
Panel B: Board size and EPS  
    ROI 
     
Spearman’s Rho Directors’ 
Remuneration 
Correlation coefficient  0.113 
  Sig. (2-tailed)  0.269 
  N  98 
 
Table 8 
Panel A: Multiple Regression analysis for ROI 
   Unstandardised 
Coefficient 
Beta 
Sig. 
Intercept   -45.056 0.020 
BSIZE   51.224 0.016 
BCOMP   -10.957 0.347 
DREM   -1.120E-06 0.584 
 
Panel B: Multiple Regression Analysis for EPS 
Model   Beta Sig. 
Intercept   -0.413 0.128 
BSIZE   0.592 0.048 
BCOMP   -0.281 0.087 
DREM   -2.991E-09 0.917 
 
 
